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In the last two decades, softwood lumber trade between Canada and the United States has 
been characterized by numerous trade restrictions. Many studies have attempted to 
quantify the effects of such sanctions, and in doing so, softwood lumber was modeled as a 
single, homogenous commodity. However, recent research has suggested that this may be 
a misleading assumption, since not all softwood lumber products are equivalent 
substitutes. We refer to this problem as the substitution bias, and uniquely address this 
issue in estimating the effects of trade restricting policies. Using a spatial price 
equilibrium (spe) model, impacts of the post-sla import duties are estimated and 
compared to estimates of two alternative policy regimes – an export tax and quota. By 
controlling for substitution bias, our estimates indicate a larger share of the tariff burden 
is placed on us consumers, with Canadian producers suffering less injury compared to 
estimates using the traditional homogenous lumber assumption. In addition, by comparing 
the net impact associated with the alternative policy regimes, a policy equivalence result 
is found. Our results suggest that the short-run impact of a trade restriction is largely 
independent of the policy regime incorporated, with the collection of quota rents or tax 
revenues determining overall winners and losers. 
 
Keywords:  Softwood lumber trade, spatial price equilibrium, lumber substitutability 1. INTRODUCTION 
A fundamental economic premise states that free trade maximizes the aggregate 
welfare of participating regions, as resources are allocated so that regions specialize in the 
production of goods and services according to their comparative advantages. However, 
moving away from free trade does not imply that all regions, or that all sectors within a 
region, are made worse off. Rather, restrictive trade sanctions alter income distributions, 
creating both winners and losers, and it is this distributional distinction that often drives 
trade policy (Boyd & Krutilla, 1987).  
The aim of this paper is to provide additional insights into the welfare 
implications of restrictive trade measures associated with the Canada-US softwood 
lumber dispute by refining the focus of traditional models used to study the topic. This 
dispute is not only the largest and longest lasting trade dispute between Canada and the 
US, it is also the largest forest products trade dispute world-wide (Zhang, 2001; Cashore, 
1998). In 2003, Canada exported 19.3 billion board feet of softwood lumber to the US 
valued at $6.7 billion (2003 $Cdn), accounting for roughly 91% of US softwood lumber 
imports (Statistics Canada, 2004b). With Canada supplying approximately 34% of the US 
softwood lumber market, the consequences of distortionary trade policies in terms of 
welfare are substantial. 
Although similar studies have looked at this issue, the current research is unique 
in its consideration of the substitutability of softwood lumber across end-uses based on 
species distinctions. By disaggregating softwood lumber into structural and non-structural 
uses, it enables us to consider these unique products separately, thereby avoiding the 
‘substitution bias.’ The value of this distinction is considerable, as Canada has insisted 
  1that the majority of its lumber exports are not perfect substitutes for all US produced 
softwood lumber, and that they compete directly only with a subset of US products. The 
implications of this argument for the softwood lumber dispute are substantial, as the issue 
of competition is a central element in the conflict. In addition, by not controlling for the 
substitution bias, the welfare inferences of previous studies may be misleading. 
2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH  
Uncontested Canada-US free trade in softwood lumber has not occurred for any 
significant period in over two decades. Many theoretical and empirical studies sought to 
analyze the effects of restricted trade on the economic wellbeing of consumers and 
producers in the two countries. Much of this work has been summarized in some of the 
more recent studies, which are briefly discussed below. 
Zhang (2001) estimated the welfare impacts associated with the Softwood Lumber 
Agreement (SLA) using an aggregate price impact model to detect a discernable change 
in both price and quantity and estimate a price impact. Average price was estimated to 
increase by some $59/mbf (1997 $US) over the first four years of the SLA.
1 He calculated 
that US producers gained some $7.7 billion while US consumers lost $12.5 billion, for a 
net loss of $4.7 billion. While Canada gained some $3.1 billion, non-Canadian exporters 
to the US also gained $626 million. The overall loss associated with the SLA was 
estimated to be $1 billion. 
Using a two-region partial equilibrium model, van Kooten (2002) estimated the 
SLA to be comparable to a 6.5% ad valorem tax in terms of its impacts on the US market. 
                                                 
1 Thousand board feet (mbf) is the common unit of measurement used in North American lumber 
markets and is equivalent to 2.36 m
3. 
  2During the SLA period, both Canadian producers (capturing quota rents) and American 
producers (receiving quasi rents) received significant benefits, by and large at the expense 
of US consumers. An optimal quota that maximized profits to Canadian producers was 
derived analytically as the sum of export quota rents and domestic producer surplus, and 
was estimated to be approximately equivalent to a 15% ad valorem tariff. In the absence 
of significant ‘quota busting’ from non-covered regions and non-covered products, he 
recommended that Canadian lumber producers form a cartel to maximize rent capture. 
Using a gravity equation, Hanlon (2004) found that the SLA was ineffective in 
restricting Canadian imports and raising prices, largely as a result of the incentive 
dynamics associated with the method of quota allocation. In contrast, post-SLA import 
duties were found to increase US prices by 12%, however, the resulting US net welfare 
was similar to that under free trade due to tariff revenues accruing to the US government. 
In contrast, in the absence of an increase in imports from non-covered regions, a price 
increase of nearly 27% was likely, which would lead to a large redistribution of surplus 
from US consumers to producers and the government, and a net welfare loss of several 
billions of dollars to the US. 
Stennes and Wilson (2005) used a spatial price equilibrium model to examine the 
welfare and income distributional effects of a 27% ad valorem tariff, a quota (equivalent 
to the tariff), and a unit tax on Canadian factors of production (resulting in equivalent US 
impacts). The tariff and quota resulted in a price wedge of roughly $80/mbf (1995 $US), 
while the unit factor tax caused prices in all regions to increase by $25-$28/mbf. Both the 
tariff and quota caused US producers and Canadian consumers to be better off at the 
expense of Canadian producers (assuming no rent was collected) and US consumers. The 
net welfare impact for the US was similar to the unit factor tax, however this policy 
  3resulted in higher domestic prices in Canada and other foreign (non-US) markets and 
accompanying net welfare losses. Net welfare gains and losses at the national level were 
dictated by which country collected the quota rents or taxes. 
Although central to the current study, the literature on substitutability between 
different softwood lumber products is sparse. Lewandrowski et al. (1994) found that pine 
lumber produced in the US west was complementary to Douglas fir lumber produced in 
the US Pacific Northwest and to southern pine produced in the US south. However, 
evidence also indicated that Douglas fir and southern pine were not substitutes, but that 
Canadian lumber was a substitute for each of these three US lumber species. The species 
mix and close proximity of Canadian producers to the US market were cited as significant 
factors to explain this result. 
Likewise, Nagubadi et al. (2003) found that Canadian spruce-pine-fir (SPF) 
lumber was unrelated to treated southern yellow pine, Douglas fir and other species 
groups that together accounted for approximately 71% of softwood lumber produced in 
the US. Rather, Canadian SPF was determined to be a substitute for both untreated 
southern yellow pine and structural panel products. Interestingly, these authors found that 
there was greater competition between structural panel products and untreated southern 
yellow pine than between Canadian SPF lumber and untreated southern yellow pine. 
Finally, Yin and Baek (2005) tested the law of one price (LOP) for US lumber 
markets using co-integration analysis on a comprehensive set of (monthly) lumber data 
covering most of the 1990s.
2 They found substantial evidence supporting the LOP 
hypothesis in terms of the main species groups, grades within those species groups and 
                                                 
2 Law of one price maintains that, once quality differences and transport and trading costs are 
taken into account, prices in separate market segments should behave uniformly and consistently 
over time. 
  4across geographic regions of the US.  
3. MODELING STRUCTURAL VS NON-STRUCTURAL TRADE IN SOFTWOOD 
LUMBER 
Previous studies of Canada-US softwood lumber trade have generally made use of 
the spatial price equilibrium (SPE) framework. The advantage of this approach is its 
regional modeling capability. By using transport costs as the source for regional price 
differentials (Boyd & Krutilla, 1987), the SPE framework implicitly assumes that a 
single, integrated North American lumber market exists. This assumption was recently 
validated by Yin and Baek (2005) for the US market. Because SPE allows multiple but 
separate supply and demand regions to be examined distinctly, it provides greater realism 
and precision compared to more aggregated approaches or econometric models. 
Importantly for the current study, the SPE model also enables us to distinguish lumber 
produced from different species, as species are often region specific. Since the standard 
SPE model in the context of forest products trade is well known (e.g., van Kooten and 
Folmer, 2004, pp.409-418), we consider only the effect that the distinction between 
structural and non-structural lumber has on the model.  
Our model consists of 15 regions allocated into net demand or net supply regions. 
An (net) excess supply region is defined as producing more lumber than it consumes, 
while a (net) excess demand region is unable to satisfy domestic consumption from 
domestic production and must therefore import lumber. Regions are categorized as net 
supply or net demand based on the production and consumption conditions that prevailed 
  5in 2003.
3 
Along with the production and consumption figures, price data and exogenous 
supply and demand elasticities are used to derive linear excess supply and excess demand 
for each region.
4 The respective functional forms of the regional (inverse) excess demand 
and excess supply functions are expressed as follows: 
(1)  Pi = αi – βiqi,    i and α ∀ i, βi > 0  
(2)  Pj =µj + δjqj,  ∀ j and δj > 0 
The variables qi and qj represent the total quantities demanded (by region i) and supplied 
(by region j) in the trade market; parameters α and µ denote the intercept terms for the 
regional (inverse) excess demand and excess supply functions, respectively, and β and δ 
represent the corresponding slope coefficients. The objective is to maximize the trade 
surplus (TS), which equals the sum of the consumer and producer surpluses in the trade 
market, by allocating lumber from excess supply to excess demand regions, while 
minimizing total shipment costs.
5 Using linear trade functions (1) and (2), and including 
transportation costs, the objective function can be written as: 
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where qij is the quantity exported by region j to region i, tij is the transportation cost from 
                                                 
3 Two regions represent supply and demand for the rest of the world, based on import and export 
levels between Canada, the US and the rest of the world.  
4 See Table A1 in Appendix A for a list of the model regions and their associated supply and 
demand elasticities. A description of production, consumption, prices and transportation data is 
provided in Appendix B.  
5 As this is a partial equilibrium analysis – softwood lumber is examined in isolation of all other 
goods – the sum of consumer and producer surpluses is not to be considered a measure of 
aggregate wellbeing (Samuelson 1952).  
  6region j to region i, and there are X exporting and M importing regions. In addition, the 
following constraints are imposed: 
(4)  ∑
i
qij ≤ qj, ∀ j   – a net supply region cannot export more than it produces (qj ). 
(5)  ∑
j
qij ≥ qi, ∀ i   – all demand in a net demand region must be satisfied.  
(6)     qi, qj, qij ≥ 0   – non-negativity. 
 
Assuming respective regional domestic supply and demand slopes are positive and 
negative (as implicitly stated in the excess supply and demand expressions), TS is strictly 
concave in qi and qj, concave in qij, and bounded from above. This assures a solution 
exists, and that it is unique in terms of qi and qj, but not necessarily for qij (Takayama & 
Judge, 1971, p.142). 
Model Calibration 
SPE models are typically calibrated on a free trade market basis, drawing on 
regional production, consumption, price and elasticity data to define domestic supply and 
demand schedules, which are in turn used to construct regional trade functions. A free 
trade market is implicitly characterized by transportation costs representing the natural 
(and exclusive) source of price differences between regions.
6 With a free trade market 
defined, trade restrictions are imposed and their impacts assessed relative to free trade.  
                                                 
6 Transportation costs in used here to refer to all costs associated with exporting lumber, which 
may include transaction costs.  
  7This approach, however, requires that the market reflect a state of a free trade, a 
condition that was absent in the North American softwood lumber market during our 
period of analysis. Specifically, in 2003 a 27.2% ad valorem tariff existed on US 
softwood lumber imports from Canada.
7 Thus, production and consumption levels 
observed in 2003 were influenced by the tariff. Hence, it was necessary to calibrate the 
free-trade model so that, when the 27.2% duty was imposed, the outcome replicated the 
observed state in 2003. The key to achieving this was to establish price-quantity pairs. 
Optimizing a SPE model yields an array of regional prices, which are centered on 
representative prices, but differentiated according to transportation costs. In the absence 
of free trade, it was necessary to incorporate policy-induced price differences as well.  
The following steps were taken to determine regional prices: (1) Using 
representative supply and demand prices, the objective function specified in the SPE 
model was maximized with reference to the Canadian excess supply curves adjusted to 
the tariff level.
8 By explicitly creating the price wedges that were present during 2003, 
this information was captured in the model-generated prices. (2) The model prices were 
re-entered into the model, and new prices were generated. After several such iterations, 
the SPE model was able to mimic the production and consumption levels observed in 
2003.
9 (3) With regional supply and demand schedules identified, free trade prices and 
quantities were determined by removing the embedded price wedges (i.e., using the free 
trade excess supply curves in the objective function).  
(4) One additional step was included to determine prices in non-tariff covered 
                                                 
7 This import tariff represented an 18.79% countervailing duty (CV) and an 8.43% anti-dumping 
duty (AD). Only the AD was imposed on the provinces in Atlantic Canada. 
8 Various composite price indexes were used to generate representative prices (Random Lengths, 
2005). See Appendix B. 
9 Roughly 99% of the data was replicated after only two price iterations.  
  8regions to which Canadian exports could flow. This was necessary because optimization 
approaches imperfectly incorporate discriminatory ad valorem tariffs.
10 What this meant 
was that the tariff-adjusted excess supply functions for the Canadian regions were applied 
to all demand regions, rather than exclusively to those in the US. To correct for this, the 
two non-US demand regions (denoted RWD and ECD) were ‘rebated’ back the tariff 
equivalent amount from the Canadian excess supply regions (via the cost coefficients for 
transport). These rebates were adjusted in the price iteration process and subsequently 
converged after a few iterations. 
Distinguishing the Markets  
In this study, we differentiate softwood lumber according to structural and non-
structural end-uses, with this distinction based on the species from which the lumber 
originates.
11 Admittedly this is not an exact demarcation, but it should suffice as a 
reasonable approximation since many species have ‘typical’ end-use applications. In 
general, structural and non-structural uses are determined by inherent strength and 
appearance characteristics, respectively. Although species are commonly classified 
according to these characteristics, there may also be considerable variation within a 
species. Incorporating species grades (strength and visual properties that largely dictate 
within-species end uses) to account for this would have been preferred, but this 
information is not available. 
Numerous sources were used to determine which species to allocate to the non-
                                                 
10 Nicholson et. al. (1994) have shown that it is not possible to directly solve a SPE model with 
discriminatory ad valorem tariffs (i.e. tariffs on imports that differ by exporting region) via an 
optimization model because the value of the tariff depends on the endogenously-determined 
supply price. However, a solution may be obtained by using an iterative process, whereby the 
approximated tariff rate is successively updated after each iteration (Nicholson & Bishop, 2004). 
11 An exception is treated Southern Yellow Pine (SYP), which was included on the basis of the 
additional treatment. 
  9structural category.
12 We defined the following species as non-structural: Cedars 
(western/inland red, incense, yellow, and Port Orford), redwood, and various pine species 
(Ponderosa, Sugar, White, Red and treated Southern Yellow). 
The SPE model was solved sequentially using two distinct markets – an all 
softwood lumber market (All SWL) that included both structural and non-structural 
lumber, and a structural softwood lumber market (Structural SWL) that excluded non-
structural lumber. The former could alternatively be referred to as the traditional market 
conventionally used in previous studies. We contend that using the Structural SWL 
market is preferred as it is a more accurate representation of a homogenous commodity, 
which is a requisite condition in SPE analysis. Further, by controlling for the substitution 
bias, we measure the impacts of trade-restricting policies more precisely.  
4. MODEL RESULTS 
The SPE model was able to simulate precisely the production and consumption 
patterns observed in 2003 (Table 1). In addition, the volume of trade flowing between 
Canadian regions and the US (which is the critical element in measuring the impacts of 
trade restrictions) is accurately reflected in the trade flows generated by the model, as 
seen in Table 2.
13 This was achieved with very few flow constraints.
14 The difference 
between the total volume of Canadian exports to the US generated by the model and 
                                                 
12 Sources included: Random Lengths, 2000; USDA, 1999; Canadian Wood Council, 2005; 
National Association of Home Builders, 2001; Cintrafor (personal communication), 2005; 
Western Wood Products Association, 2001, 2005; and Nagubadi et. al., 2003. 
13 Regional information on actual flows of Structural SWL from Canada to the US was not 
available. However, the model was able to replicate the total volume of Canadian Structural SWL 
exports to the US, exclusive of the estimated 129 mmbf of Structural SWL brought into Canada. 
14 In the All SWL market, two ‘minimum shipment’ flow constraints were imposed. These lower 
bounds were (mmbf): 468 from the US to RWD and 300 from AC to ECD. For the Structural 
SWL market, three lower bounds were imposed: 393 from the US to RWD, 165 from AB to ECD, 
and 300 from AC to ECD. 
  10actual 2003 exports is equivalent to the volume of lumber imported into Canada from the 
US and the rest of the world. 
The base case for our two model formulations is given in Table 3. These 
production, consumption and price figures reflect a paradigm of unconstrained (free) 
trade between Canada and the US, and were used as a basis for comparing the restrictive 
trade policies. 
 
  <Insert Tables 1, 2 and 3 about here> 
 
Policy Scenarios and Impacts 
Three conventional trade policies (all of which have, at some point, characterized 
softwood lumber trade between Canada and the US) were examined: a 27.2% ad valorem 
import tariff (8.4% for Atlantic Canada i.e. the AC region), a quota (restricting Canadian 
regional exports to the same levels observed with the tariff), and a unit export tax 
(restricting total Canadian exports to the same level observed with the tariff).
15 The price 
impacts of these trade policies are presented in Table 4 for both markets. As suspected, all 
policies yield similar price impacts within the export markets since the total volume of 
Canadian lumber exported to the US was equated across the three policies. However, the 
unit export tax resulted in larger Canadian market impacts than the quota or the ad 
valorem tariff. Moreover, all three policies are clearly effective in creating a substantial 
price wedge between Canadian and US regions, averaging $74/mbf in the ‘All SWL’ 
                                                 
15 The unit export tax imposed on the AC region was roughly one third of that applied to the other 
Canadian supply regions (which is consistent with the tariff case, and allows the polices to be 
directly compared). 
  11market and $70/mbf in the ‘Structural SWL’ market.
16 The AC region is an exception, 
however, as the trade policies cause the price to increase. In this case, the relative 
advantage of less restrictive policies is translated into an explicit net gain for this region. 
Regional production and consumption levels adjust in the usual manner in response to the 
prices changes. 
 
    <Insert Table 4 about here> 
 
Welfare impacts are presented in Table 5, as percent changes from the base case. 
As with prices, regional welfare changes are comparable across all policies within each 
market. Relative to free trade, Canada as a whole is clearly worse off. As all but one 
Canadian region is a net supplier, the losses in producer surplus largely surpass the 
modest gain in consumer surplus. Taken as a whole, the US is also significantly worse off 
with trade sanctions. With all but one US region importing lumber, the losses to 
consumers largely exceed producer gains. The two countries in aggregate experience a 
net loss. However, ignored in these conclusions are the policy-induced revenues – tariff 
payments, quota rents and unit export fees (which are shown below). The country 
collecting these revenues gains considerably. 
 
    <Insert Table 5 about here> 
  
Also provided in Table 5 are estimates of the dead weight losses (DWL) 
                                                 
16 This price wedge was determined using the average price differences between Canadian supply 
regions (excluding AC) and the US demand regions to which they export.  
  12associated with each trade policy. These are an indicator of the welfare loss that occurs in 
moving away from free trade. It is important to emphasize that, although the DWL 
estimates are significant, ranging from roughly $27 million to $63 million in 2003, 
income redistributions play a much greater role. The most important of these is the 
transfer of surplus from US consumers to those collecting the policy-induced rents.
 17 
Comparing Results between Markets 
A comparison of the price impacts across policies in the ‘All SWL’ and the 
‘Structural SWL’ markets reveals some interesting results. Most notably, in the 
‘Structural SWL’ market the prices in Canadian supply regions fall by less, while the 
prices in US demand regions increases by more compared to the price changes in the ‘All 
SWL’ market. The explanation for this result can be found by examining the price wedge 
structures in both markets. Using the model with structural lumber, consumption and 
production dynamics are altered, with Canada’s share of total US-Canada production 
increasing from 48% to 55%. The direct implication of these changes is a partial transfer 
of the tariff burden from Canadian producers to US consumers. A general case for 
Canada and the US is illustrated in Figure 1, where ‘St’ subscripts denote ‘Structural 
SWL’ and ‘All’ refers to ‘All SWL’. As an example, given an average lumber price of 
$300/mbf, US consumers move from a $25.3/mbf price rise to a $30.6/mbf price rise 
when the price results of the Structural market are used instead of the All SWL market.  
A comparison of welfare impacts in the ‘All SWL’ and ‘Structural SWL’ market 
approaches follows intuitively from the price results. Although Table 5 provides some 
                                                 
17 With respect to the current softwood lumber duties, tariff revenues collected by the US 
government may be further reallocated to US producers under the highly contentious Byrd 
amendment. 
  13indication as to how welfare changes in absolute terms in the two markets, it is important 
to note that these figure are not directly comparable since they represent changes relative 
to two unique base cases (with the former inclusive of non-structural lumber). However, 
it is worthy to note that the welfare loss to the US is greater in absolute terms in the 
Structural market even though the welfare losses associated with non-structural lumber 
are not captured. Overall, the loss in welfare is greater for US importing regions and less 
for Canadian supply regions when the ‘Structural SWL’ market is considered rather than 
the ‘All SWL’ market.  
Figure 2 illustrates the changes in US welfare for a given tariff level in a simple 
fashion. Rightward movement along the horizontal axis corresponds to an increasing 
demand to supply ratio. Where the curve crosses the horizontal axis, US domestic 
demand is perfectly satisfied by US domestic supply. An import tariff imposed at this 
point would have no impact on US welfare. To the right of this intersection, US domestic 
demand is greater than supply and lumber is imported. With an import tariff imposed in 
this situation, the US experiences a net loss in welfare, since the loss in consumer surplus 
more than offsets the gain to US producers. Whereas welfare estimates based on the 
traditional market may have fallen around a point such as A, controlling for the substitute 
bias is associated with a downward movement, perhaps to point B. In this analysis, point 
A is associated with a 0.9% loss in welfare based on the traditional SWL market, while 
point B corresponds to a 1.2% welfare loss obtained from the ‘Structural SWL’ market. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
As supply and demand elasticities play a key role in our SPE model estimates, 
alternate values were tested in order to assess the robustness of our results. Specifically, 
  14we consider a demand elasticity of –0.34 (double the original value), and then double all 
supply elasticities. With more price responsive (elastic) demand, consumers are better 
able to adjust their spending behavior and hence a smaller amount of consumer surplus is 
lost. This comes at the expense of producer gains, and is observed irrespective of the 
trade policy. Conversely, when supply becomes more elastic, producers can react to price 
signals with more flexibility and hence capture a larger in share of the surplus that would 
have otherwise gone to consumers. Results of the sensitivity analysis for the ‘Structural 
SWL’ market are provided in Table 6. Changes in elasticities influence the size of welfare 
changes, but not the rankings of winners and losers. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, we examined the impacts of removing non-structural SWL, a 
product that has been argued to be complementary rather than competitive with structural 
SWL, from the SPE framework used to investigate the impacts of Canada-US trade 
disputes in softwood lumber. We find that the scale and delineation of estimated policy 
impacts are fundamentally altered: The negative impacts exerted by trade policies on US 
consumers become more pronounced, whereas injury to Canadian producers is reduced. 
In the context of current import duties, the tariff-induced price increase in the US is 
approximately 21% higher when modeling the ‘Structural SWL’ market rather than the 
traditional ‘All SWL’ market. This corresponds to an additional $37 million in losses, 
exclusive of the direct losses incurred from consuming tariff-induced higher priced non-
structural lumber. In contrast, Canadian prices fall almost 15% less when only ‘Structural 
SWL’ is considered, resulting in gains of nearly $200 million, though we expect this 
would be slightly lower if changes in the non-structural lumber market were also taken 
  15into account.  
From a supply perspective, restricted trade has promoted growth in US lumber 
imports from non-covered (or less covered) regions, and non-covered products coming 
from regions affected by the trade sanctions. Since the imposition of the quota in 1996 
(and through the subsequent tariff period), US imports of softwood lumber from non-
Canadian regions have risen by over two billion board feet, representing more than a six 
fold increase (USDA, 2004-05). In addition, US bound softwood lumber exports from 
Atlantic Canada (which was excluded from the SLA quota and exempt from the 
countervailing portion of the current duties) nearly doubled during this same period 
(Statistics Canada, 2004b). In relation to exempt products, Canadian raw log exports to 
the US have increased approximately 5½ times since 1996, even with various domestic 
impediments in place (USDA, 2004-05). Moreover, US imports of many value-added 
products from Canada have experienced significant growth.
18  
On the demand side, the persistence of restricted trade has directly impacted 
lumber consumption. The disparity in Canadian and US lumber prices resulting from the 
price wedge is clearly reflected in consumption statistics. From 1996 to 2003, per capita 
lumber consumption increased by 71% in Canada, but only by 3% in the US. Higher US 
lumber prices have played a role in both discouraging construction and promoting 
substitution to non-lumber products. The results of this study highlight this point as it 
indicates that US consumers incur even greater losses  when we control for the 
substitution of various types of lumber. Canadian new home construction increased by 
                                                 
18US imports of various Canadian value-added wood products not covered by the trade 
restrictions have increased significantly since 1996. For instance, Canadian wood door and frame 
exports to the US have more than tripled and pre-fabricated building exports have increased 
nearly nine times since 1996. 
  1675% between 1996 and 2003, but US housing starts rose only by some 25%. The 
significance of this trend is evident considering home construction and supporting 
industries have been important drivers of the US economy in recent years. Furthermore, it 
was estimated that US lumber use in wall, floor and roof framing decreased by 11%, 29% 
and 22%, respectively, between 1995 and 1998 (Cintrafor, 2000). The use of engineered 
wood products (glulam beams, I-joists, etc.) and non-wood products, such as steel and 
concrete, are increasing at the expense of lumber. 
It is unlikely that the structural shifts occurring in US markets for softwood 
lumber will easily be reversed. Inroads by overseas producers and substitute products 
have been significant and their market shares will probably continue to grow. Overall, it 
is likely that the success, which the US CFLI has had in lobbying for restrictions on 
Canadian lumber imports will be eroded over time as a result of these structural changes, 
which continue to shrink the potentially exploitable margins.
19  
The latter conclusions are not altogether firm because the spatial price equilibrium 
model is static. Future research needs to take into account dynamic aspects of supply and 
demand, as some have suggested that the inter-temporal equivalence of trade policies, and 
the concomitant characteristics of their impacts, can diverge significantly due to 
underlying structural movements in demand and supply (Adams and Haynes, 1981; 
Stennes and Wilson, 2005; Schwindt et. al., 2004).  
Future research also needs to examine in greater detail the complementarity and 
substitutability among various wood products, and non-wood products, used in 
construction. While we have demonstrated that distinguishing between structural and 
                                                 
19 The Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports (CFLI) is an assemblage of US producers and 
timberland owners. 
  17non-structural softwood lumber is important, the extent to which Canadian softwood 
lumber exports compete with various US lumber products is an issue that requires further 
study.  
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Figure 1. Price Wedge Structures and Shares of the Tariff Burden 






























Figure 2. Welfare and the US Domestic Economy for a given Tariff Level 
 
  24Table 1: Production, Consumption & Prices in the Two Model Formulations, 2003 
with Tariffs  
All SWL  Structural SWL 
Prod.  Cons. Prices Prod.  Cons. Prices 
 
Region 







  15,010 
    3,195 
       686 
  11,295 
    2,568 
           0 
   1,724 
   1,579 
      245 
   6,055 
      635 







  14,122 
    3,195 
       686 
  10,690 
    2,497 
           0 
    1,614 
    1,579 
       238 
    5,826 
       594 















    2,627 
    7,116 
    1,319 
       589 
    9,794 
    3,630 
  10,871 
   6,016 
 12,228 
   8,531 
 11,657 
 10,220 
   5,618 








    1,502 
    4,412 
       716 
       455 
    5,961 
    2,851 
    9,646 
    4,757 
    9,669 
    6,746 
    9,217 
    8,081 
    4,442 








US    35,497   56,355      25,542    44,562   
RWS 
RWD 
    1,947 
           0 
         0 
  2,741 
      269 
      359 
       965 
           0 
           0 
    2,591 
      267 
      346 
 
  25Table 2: SPE Model & Actual Trade Flows to the US in 2003 
Region  Model Flows  Actual Flows 
BC 10,000  10,127 
AB 1,616  1,591 
ROC 441  453 
EC 5,240  5,368 
AC 1,634  1,672 
Total  18,931 19,211 
 
 
  26Table 3: Production, Consumption and Prices in the Two Model Formulations, 2003 
Free Trade (Base Case)  
All SWL  Structural SWL 
Prod. Cons.  Prices  Prod. Cons.  Prices 
 
Region 








  3,408 
     732 
12,380 
  2,557 
         0 
  1,678 
  1,536 
     238 
  5,882 
     636 








  3,379 
     726 
11,887 
  2,460 
         0 
  1,578 
  1,443 
     232 
  5,679 
     597 















  2,559 
  6,621 
  1,301 
     551 
  9,097 
  3,385 
10,547 
  6,095 
12,378 
  8,640 
11,809 
10,352 
  5,692 










   704 




  4,831 
  9,810 
  6,848 
  9,361 
  8,205 
  4,512 








US     34,061     57,083      24,005     45,247   
RWS 
RWD 
    1,624 
           0 
            0 
     2,679 
       239 
       406 
       782 
           0 
            0 
     2,540 
       233 




  27Table 4: Change in Price Relative to the Free Trade Case (%) 
  ---------------All SWL---------------  ---------------Structural SWL--------------- 
Region Tariff Quota  Export  Tax Tariff  Quota Export  Tax 
BC  -13.6  -13.6  -14.8 -11.8 -11.9 -13.2 
AB  -13.8  -13.8  -14.3 -12.1 -12.1 -12.7 
ROC -14.0  -14.0  -13.9 -12.4 -12.4 -12.3 
EC  -14.4  -14.4  -13.2 -12.9 -12.9 -11.6 
AC 0.8  0.8  2.1 2.6 2.6 4.0 
ECD -11.1  -10.9  -11.9  -9.7  -9.4  -10.4 
CAL 8.4  8.4 8.4  10.1 10.1 10.1 
SE  7.8  7.8  7.8 9.4 9.4 9.4 
NE 8.1  8.1  8.1 9.8 9.8 9.8 
NC  8.3  8.3 8.3  10.1 10.1 10.1 
SC  8.2  8.2  8.2 9.9 9.9 9.9 
MTN  8.5  8.5 8.5  10.3 10.3 10.3 
PNW  9.7  9.7 9.7  11.9 11.9 11.9 
RWS  12.4  12.4  12.4 14.5 14.5 14.5 
RWD -11.6  -10.0 -10.9  -10.4  -8.6  -9.5 
 
 
  28Table 5: Changes in Welfare by Region from Free Trade for both “All SWL” and 
“Structural SWL” Formulation 
Tariff Quota  Unit  Tax   














































































































































  29Table 6: Aggregate Welfare with Alternative Supply & Demand Elasticities (‘000s 
$US) (Structural SWL) 
  Tariff   Quota   Unit  Export  Tax 



















CS      377     396     361       376     396     360       362     382     345 
PS  -1064  -1141 -1049   -1068  -1149 -1051   -1068  -1147 -1051 
Total    -687    -745    -688      -692    -753    -691      -706    -765    -705 
United States 
CS  -1519 -1426 -1588   -1519  -1426 -1588   -1520  -1423 -1591 
PS     838     783     846       838     783     846       838     781     848 
Total    -681   -643   -742      -681    -643    -742      -681    -641    -743 
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BC  British Columbia   0.529  -0.17 
AB Alberta    0.415  -0.17 
Saskatchewan   ROC 
Manitoba  
0.415 -0.17 
Ontario   EC 
Quebec  
0.57 -0.17 
New Brunswick  
Nova Scotia  
Prince Edward Island  
AC 
Newfoundland & Labrador 
0.57 -0.17 
ECD n.a.  n.a.  -0.17 
CAL   California   0.335  -0.17 
SE South  East  US  0.963  -0.17 
NE North  East  US  0.188  -0.17 
NC  North Central US  0.848  -0.17 
SC  South Central US  0.937  -0.17 
MTN US  Mountain  0.866  -0.17 
PNW  Pacific Northwest   0.335  -0.17 
RWS  Rest of World Supply  1.5  n.a. 
RWD  Rest of World Demand  n.a.  -0.17 
a Regions are consistent with those used in Stennes and Wilson, 2005 
(slightly modified from Haynes, 2003) with the exception of a slight change 
in ECD.  
b Supply elasticities are consistent with those used in Stennes and Wilson 
(2005). One exception is that a supply elasticity of 1.5 was used for the 
RWS region, as was assumed by Adams (2003). 
Sources: Stennes and Wilson (2005); Adams (2003); Adams and Haynes 
(1996); Latta and Adams (2000); Zhang (2001).  
  31APPENDIX B: DATA ELEMENTS 
Production & Consumption 
Reported data on total softwood lumber production was utilized in the ‘All SWL’ 
model formulation, though a few figures were estimated (US Census Bureau, 2004; 
Statistics Canada, 2004a, 2005a; NRCan, 2004; Forest Resources, 2005; Newfoundland 
and Labrador Department of Finance, 2005; Spelter & Alderman, 2003; WWPA, 2004; 
SFPA, 2005). In the ‘Structural SWL’ formulation, the production data was adjusted to 
exclude production of non-structural species (as defined in this paper). With non-
structural production volumes reported for major non-structural producing regions, 
remaining volumes were allocated based on various estimates and assumptions. Non-
North American supply was derived from Canada and US overseas imports (USDA, 
2004-05; Statistics Canada, 2004b). 
Consumption in the ‘All SWL’ model formulation was determined by allocating 
(national level) total apparent consumption of All SWL to the (country) regions, where 
apparent consumption is defined as domestic production plus imports minus exports. 
(USDA, 2004-05; Statistics Canada, 2004b; WWPA, 2004; US Census Bureau, 2005; 
National Association of Realtors, 2005; Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, 
2004; Statistics Canada, 2005b; Random Lengths, 2004; Global Wood, 2005; World 
Forestry Institute, 2005.). In the ‘Structural SWL’ formulation, apparent consumption of 
structural SWL was used in place of ‘All SWL’. Non North American demand was based 
on Canada and US overseas exports (USDA, 2004-05; Statistics Canada, 2004b). 
Prices 
Representative prices (Rp), used to anchor the range of endogenous prices, were 
  32determined using four lumber composite price indexes: framing lumber, low-grade 
random dimension lumber, shop & molding lumber, and boards (Random Lengths, 2005). 
The framing lumber index was used as the Rp in the ‘Structural SWL’ formulation. A 
non-structural lumber index was approximated based on the remaining three indexes. The 
Rp in the All SWL formulation was determined using an average of the structural and 
non-structural lumber indexes, based on respective shares of total production in 2003. 
Transportation Costs 
Transportation costs are defined between excess supply and excess demand 
regions. These costs reflect a fixed and a variable component. The fixed segment 
(equivalent across all supply regions and independent of distance) represents the cost of 
moving lumber to the rail point within a region. The variable segment signifies the cost of 
moving lumber between net supply regions and net demand regions in North America 
(BNSF, 2004; CN Rail, 2004; CPR, 2004; CSX Corporation, 2004; Norfolk Southern 
Corporation, 2004; Union Pacific Railroad, 2004). Container costs were used 
synonymously with rail costs for movement between North America and the rest of the 
world (Maersk Sealand, 2004; P&O Nedlloyd, 2004). Costs are adjusted to 2003 real US 
dollars. Transportation costs used in the ‘All SWL’ formulation are shown in Table B1. 
The transport cost matrix used in the ‘Structural SWL’ formulation was similar with the 
following exceptions: RWS to CAL, MTN, SE, and SC were 178.24, 168.40, 127.01 and 
144.47, respectively. 
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Table B1: Transportation Costs (2003 $US per thousand board feet) 
To/From  CAL  MTN SE  SC  NE  NC ECD  RWD 
BC  56.82 52.59 83.81 63.28 85.50 58.89 74.17  108.22 
AB  61.82 58.08 73.20 60.02 74.89 48.27 67.07  125.74 
ROC  62.79 49.44 66.42 48.95 67.51 39.96  n.a. 133.38 
EC  67.56 51.88 46.27 47.56 31.45 39.80  n.a. 109.28 
AC  99.79 83.33 63.02 66.83 44.39 59.99 53.87  109.28 
PNW  54.11 48.78 76.66 56.53 80.76 52.48 81.68  114.44 
RWS  127.36 169.37 157.17 158.08 127.01 153.62 149.63  n.a. 
 